Mistaking the Mehdi...

Yesterday the leader of Iraq's Shia Mehdi Army, Muqtada al-Sadr, extended the August 2007 ceasefire by an additional 6 months, amid fears that violence could once again rise in the country should the ceasefire run out. The group, which was formed in 2003, has been fighting against coalition troops and Iraqi security forces since its creation, and has made many efforts to also concentrate firepower against Sunni/Kurd-insurgent groups such as Jamaat Ansar al-Sunna. Although suicide-bombings are looked upon as 'Haram' by members of the group, roadside-bombs (known by coalition forces as IED's) are not; and the discovery of high-tech weaponry used by the group has risen speculation that neighbouring Iran may play a part in it's initial and continued arming.

To me the move by the cleric doesn't make sense. The Mehdi Army has never been afraid of violence, hence its voluntary creation in the first place; and ending fighting, or denouncing violence would render Muqtada al-Sadrs leadership as pretty pointless, (unless the group was to become a political entity, rather than a purely paramilitary one). Another possibility is of course that the group just wants to re-stock up on arms, and the expected delivery date from Iran has been delayed. Iranian-post huh, but hey what did they expect?

As a long standing supporter of both the Iraq & Afghanistan invasions (both for different reasons), I find it hard to admit that coalition governments may have underestimated the cultural, religious and ethnic tensions left as part of Saddam Hussain's notorious legacy in Iraq. As is known, the Sunni-dictatorship which ruled Iraq horrifically persecuted both the majority Shia, and Kurdish populations of the country; using weapons of mass destruction, in operations like that of the Al-Anfal campaign, to do so. Since the invasion, both Sunni & Shia Muslims have been treated very much the same by coalition forces, which perhaps mistakenly saw them as just 'Iraqis', rather than seperate entities. By examining past events in History, perhaps I can further highlight what could have been done in utilising the political climate to our gain.

Last month here on the Isle of Man, I went along to a lecture on the English Civil War which was conducted by a leading man in the field, Professor Ronald Hutton of Bristol University. The professor outlined in the lecture that even before King Charles I raised his banner at Nottingham in 1642, declaring war on Parliament, the religious and cultural tensions within society had already decided which members of the population would side with who. Professor Hutton likened the situation to a rock which has been thrown against a wall with force. The rock will not break in a random fashion, but rather along pre-existing fault lines already existent within the rock. Studying these fault-lines before the rock is thrown could enable us to predict how the situation will unfold, and therefore help us know how to use it to our advantage.

The same could be said about Iraq, without understanding the tensions between Iraq's communities prior to the invasion, the hard-road might have been taken in trying to unite its reluctant peoples. The coalition governments, upon removing Saddam Hussain from power, expected the liberated Iraqis to take over the country, much as most liberated peoples have done in ages past. The people however were divided by tensions, and inexperienced in leadership and free-thought, deeming them incapable of anything to begin with. The crisis of the growth in violence and continuing political instability in the country was the impact of that rock hitting the wall, and the events that followed could have been known.

In my view, more of an effort should have been made to appease the majority Shia population in the forming of a new Iraq, rather than the Sunni. The Sunnis had their chance in ruling the country under the Ba'ath Party, and can't have felt anywhere near as persecuted as the Shias and Kurds. This desire for revenge by the Shia population was not appeased by the trial and execution of Saddam Hussain, but was split, bent and directed towards coalition forces and many innocent Sunni civilians in anger. This upsurge in violence by the Shia community could and should have been predicted by coalition governments.


A surprised realisation of the violence, followed by an attempt to stop the Mehdi Army using force, has not only encouraged the desire by Shias to make coalition forces their enemy, but has also ensured the group now has backing from Iran. British bases in Basra reported frequent rocket-attacks by Shia militias before the handover to Iraqi security forces in December, since then Iraq's second largest city has been much quieter. During the attacks however, some people in the nearby streets were heard by several inhabitants of Basra speaking 'Farsi', the language of nearby Iran; and many shells were also understood to be from across the border.

Al-Qaeda in Iraq is now, and has been since the invasion, a huge threat to the national security of the country. With foreign fighters actively recruited and imported by Al-Qaeda to fight the U.S. and Iraqi security forces, suicide bombings are commonplace and are seemingly very hard to prevent. The might of the Mehdi Army, had the Shias been properly utilised by coalition forces, could have been used to fight the Sunni Al-Qaeda presence in Iraq; and with the right support, could have potentially wiped out Al-Qaeda from Iraq all together. Instead, the road in making Iraq a democracy again has been made much harder due to the failure to understand community tensions, making coalition forces an enemy of both the Mehdi Army, and Al-Qaeda in post-invasion Iraq.

Despite what might seem as being harsh criticism towards strategic operations in Iraq, I have overwhelming faith that the country will one day become a fully democratic, fully in-control one thanks to the continued presence of coalition forces there, and every day the Iraqi government's mere existence is living proof of this. I hope also however that the fury of the Mehdi Army can somehow be tamed before Iraq arrives at what is generally considered to be the most deciding factor in the future of middle-east politics...

(Picture 1: Leader of the Mehdi Army and Shia Cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.)

(Picture 2: Members of the Mehdi Army during a street march.)